

SECRET

Interagency Group/Counterintelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

12 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, IG/CI Working Group

FROM: Edward J. O'Malley
Chairman, Interagency Group/Counterintelligence

SUBJECT: NSSD-2/82 Study Recommendations re Limitations
on the Hostile Foreign Presence in the U.S.

1. Senior Interagency Group/Intelligence Directive No. 1, issued on 5 August 1982, designated a representative of the Director, FBI as Chairman of the Interagency Group/Counterintelligence responsible for national counterintelligence policy under the SIG-I, including counter-espionage and the countering of active measures. As Chairman, I have been tasked to prepare a study on the issues of limiting the hostile foreign presence in the United States and travel controls on that presence. To do so, I am establishing a working group consisting of IG/CI members and others (Departments of Commerce, Energy and Justice) whom I believe have an interest in these issues.

FBI Review
Completed

2. The July 1982 NSSD-2 study, "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983-1988," judged that the numbers of

[redacted] personnel present in the United States for both official and unofficial purposes has grown significantly. It further states that the counterintelligence agencies lack the capability to monitor this presence closely. One recommended approach to reducing the resulting burden on the agencies was placing limits on both the official and non-official presence of those personnel permitted to function in the United States. The study also recommends that travel controls on [redacted] personnel be tightened and more strictly enforced and that travel notification should be required [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

3. In a covering letter dated 15 July 1982 forwarding the referenced study to the President, the Director of Central Intelligence reiterated that limiting the numbers of hostile

Change classification stamp from classified by: 60319ba/nmw/KSP/gm Declassified on: 5/3/2011/6/2032 (FBI 58-20)

SECRET

~~Classified by: 05~~
~~Reason: FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)~~
~~Declassification: OADR~~

SECRET

officials and non-officials and restricting their activities can reduce the intelligence threat posed by those personnel. It was noted, however, that while this approach can be accomplished quickly and without heavy resource requirements, there are political and other side effects to be weighed.

4. Based on the foregoing background and in accordance with the Action Plan tabled at the SIG-I meeting on 12 July 1982, the Chairman of the SIG-I has directed that early consideration be given to the hostile presence limitation issue. The views of all departments and agencies whose interests and responsibilities are involved are being solicited in order that this matter can be addressed by the SIG-I in September 1982.

5. In reviewing the limitation issue, the following information should be developed:

a. Identification of those [] countries whose presence and activities constitute a threat to U.S. national security. (FBI, CIA, DOD)

25X1

b. Current size of the official and non-official [] presence and growth trends since 1972. (FBI, State)

25X1

c. U. S. official and non-official [] (State, DOD, CIA)

25X1

d. Existing personnel limitations (if any) and policy considerations affecting those limits. (State, DOD)

e. U. S. jurisdiction over [] staffing of their missions to the United Nations, and their UN Secretariat representation. (Justice and State)

25X1

f. Alternative means and extent of placing limits on the: (All)

-- official presence

-- non-official presence.

SECRET

- g. Impact on counterintelligence agencies. (FBI, DOD, CIA)
- h. Political effect. (State, CIA, DOD)
- i. Other side effects (retaliation, etc.). (State, CIA, DOD)
- j. Other factors which should be considered. (State, CIA, DOD)
- k. Experience of other countries (United Kingdom, Canada, Australia) which have imposed personnel limits [redacted] (State, CIA, DOD)

25X1

6. Controls on travel are central to restricting the activities of hostile officials and non-officials and which, with personnel limitations, are to be addressed.

7. In reviewing the travel control and notification issue, the following information should be developed:

a. Existing controls on travel of [redacted] officials and non-officials (as applicable) and adherence to these controls. (State, DOD, FBI)

25X1

b. Alternative means and extent of controlling travel of: (State, DOD, FBI)

-- officials and

-- non-officials.

c. Authority of U. S. to place travel controls on [redacted] personnel assigned to their UN missions or to the UN Secretariat. (State & Justice)

25X1

d. Impact on counterintelligence agencies. (FBI, DOD, CIA)

e. Political effect. (State, DOD, CIA)

f. Other side effects (retaliation, etc.). (State, DOD, CIA)

g. Other factors which should be considered. (All)

h. Experience of other countries with respect to imposition of travel controls on [redacted] personnel. (State, CIA, DOD)

25X1


SECRET

8. Agencies having primary responsibility have been set forth in parenthesis following each topic; however, all members of the IG are encouraged to comment on any item listed. Recipients are requested to provide written comments by 23 August 1982 to the Community Counterintelligence Staff [redacted] mailing address

Room 5E25 CIA Headquarters.

25X1

9. Following review of your comments, there will be a meeting of the IG/CI to discuss those areas on which there is essential agreement for recommending restrictions and to define those other areas on which additional comments are needed. The IG/CI meeting has been tentatively scheduled for 30 August 1982. You will be advised of the time and place.



Edward J. O'Malley

SECRET

STAT

Distribution of D/ICS-82-0645 (all w/atts):

- 0 - Addee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ED
- 1 - D/ICS
- 1 - SA-D/ICS
- 1 - D/OCC/ICS
- 1 - ER
- 1 - ICS Registry
- 1 - CCIS Subject
- 1 - C/CCIS Chrono

UNCLASSIFIED